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Abstract
Background: It is widely believed that corporate actors exert substantial influence on the making of public health
policy, including in the alcohol field. However, the industry is far from being monolithic, comprising a range of
producers and retailers with varying and diverse interests. With a focus on contemporary debates concerning the
minimum pricing of alcohol in the UK, this study examined the differing interests of actors within the alcohol
industry, the cleavages which emerged between them on this issue and how this impacted on their ability to
organise themselves collectively to influence the policy process. We conducted 35 semi-structured interviews
between June and November 2010 with respondents from all sectors of the industry as well as a range of non-
industry actors who had knowledge of the alcohol policy process, including former Ministers, Members of the UK
Parliament and the Scottish Parliament, civil servants, members of civil society organisations and professionals.
Methods: The paper draws on an analysis of publicly available documents and 35 semi-structured interviews with
respondents from the alcohol industry (on- and off-trade including retailers, producers of wines, spirits and beers
and trade associations) and a range of non-industry actors with knowledge of the alcohol policy process (including
former Ministers, Members of Parliament and of the Scottish Parliament, civil servants, members of civil society
organisations and professional groups). Interviews were recorded, transcribed and analysed using Nvivo qualitative
analysis software. Processes of triangulation between data sources and different types of respondent sought to
ensure we gained as accurate a picture as possible of industry participation in the policy process.
Results: Divergences of interest were evident between producers and retailers and within the retail sector between
the on and off trade. Divisions within the alcohol industry, however, existed not only between these sectors, but
within them. Cleavages were evident within the producer sector between different product categories and within
the retail sector between different types of off-trade retailers. However, trade associations were particularly
important in providing a means by which the entire industry, or broad sectors within it, could speak with a single
voice, despite the limitations on this. There was also evidence of ad-hoc cooperation on specific issues, which
resulted from both formal and informal contacts between industry actors.
Conclusions: Alcohol industry corporations and trade associations collaborate with one another effectively where
there are shared interests, allowing the best placed bodies to lead on a given issue. Thus, whilst industry actors may
be deeply divided on certain issues they are able to coordinate their positions on occasions where there are clear
advantages in so doing. Health policymakers may benefit from an awareness of the multiplicity of interests within
the industry and the ways that these may shape collective lobbying positions.
Keywords: Alcohol, Industry, Policy influence, Lobbying, Minimum pricing
* Correspondence: ben.hawkins@lshtm.ac.uk
2London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, 15-17 Tavistock Place,
London WC1H 9SH, UK
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© 2012 Holden et al.; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Holden et al. BMC Public Health 2012, 12:483
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/12/483
Background
Over the past four decades there has been a sharp in-
crease in the affordability of alcohol in the United King-
dom (UK) [1]. This fall in the price of alcohol in relation
to income has coincided with an increase in the aggre-
gate levels of alcohol consumption and alcohol related
harm in the UK [2,3]. Furthermore, the trend during this
period has been for a shift in sales from the on-trade to
the off-trade, which has resulted at least in part from the
expansion of national supermarket chains and their use
of discounted alcohol as a key component of their pro-
motional activity [4]. This combination of factors has
resulted in policy debates – initially in Scotland and sub-
sequently in Westminster – gravitating towards price as
a mechanism for reducing rates of alcohol related harm.
In 2009, the Scottish Government proposed legislation
which introduced a series of measures designed to re-
duce the availability of alcohol, including a minimum
price of 45p per unit [5]. The Alcohol Etc (Scotland) Bill
was passed on 11 November 2010 but, following wide-
spread opposition from sections of the alcohol industry
and opposition MSPs, the clause introducing minimum
unit pricing (MUP) was removed. The new SNP majority
administration elected in May 2011 subsequently intro-
duced a further Bill to the Scottish Parliament to imple-
ment MUP. The Conservative-Liberal Democrat
administration in Westminster announced similar plans
to legislate for MUP in March 2012 [6]. The present
study focuses on the debates surrounding pricing and
promotions policy in England and Scotland between
May 2007 and November 2010.
The alcohol industry has generally been seen as
opposed to public health interventions based upon
price. Furthermore, a number of commentators have
made reference to the perceived influence of the in-
dustry on government policy and have called for more
research on its activities [7-10]. However, despite a
growing literature on the role of corporate actors in
other areas of public health policy-making, such as
tobacco [11], there have been very few studies of the
role of industry actors in the alcohol policy process
[12-14]. Furthermore, in the calls for more research,
there has been little consideration of exactly what con-
stitutes ‘the industry’. As Jernigan [15] points out, the
alcohol industry is composed not just of producers of
different kinds of beverages but also of distributors
and retailers, including those engaged in the sale of al-
cohol through both the on-trade (pubs, bars, restau-
rants and nightclubs) and the off-trade (supermarkets,
convenience stores and off-licences). Whilst the diverse
range of actors within the industry has been commen-
ted upon before [16], this is the first study to examine
how the dynamics between these players affect their
ability to organise politically. We discuss the specific
lobbying strategies of alcohol industry actors elsewhere.
This article examines the differing interests of the
range of actors comprising the alcohol industry, the
cleavages which emerged between them on the issue
of government intervention on alcohol pricing and
how this impacted on their ability to organise them-
selves collectively in order to influence the policy
process.
Methods
Investigating internal industry or corporate processes is
inherently difficult due to problems of access and the
risk that, where access is obtained, this may not result in
meaningful data. This is particularly the case where cor-
porate influence on the policy process is being investi-
gated, since corporate actors may be reluctant to share
information that is not already publicly available. Re-
search on the activities of tobacco companies in influen-
cing the policy process has relied overwhelmingly on
internal industry documentation released as a result of
litigation [17]. Nevertheless, semi-structured interviews
have been utilised successfully in a number of studies of
corporate political influence, such as that by Braithwaite
and Drahos [18]. Despite the limitations of such inter-
views, they are the most feasible means of gaining
insight into corporate actors’ political strategies in the
absence of access to internal documents.
The present study began with a preliminary stake-
holder analysis [19,20] based on a review of relevant
literature, documents and our existing knowledge of
the alcohol industry and policy process. This provided
the basis for purposive sampling of potential respon-
dents who were approached for semi-structured inter-
views via email, telephone or in person. We also
made use of snowball sampling, whereby initial
respondents were asked to help identify other relevant
informants. All potential respondents were provided
with written details about the nature and aims of the
research before deciding whether to participate. This
highlighted the focus of the project on alcohol policy
making in the area of pricing and promotions policy
and the role of corporate actors within it. All respon-
dents were asked to sign a consent form confirming
if the interview could be recorded and indicating their
willingness to be quoted and/or identified in any sub-
sequent outputs. A number of respondents agreed to
be interviewed on condition of anonymity and/or con-
fidentiality. Ethical approval was obtained from the
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine re-
search ethics committee.
A range of actors engaged in the alcohol policy-
making process at both Westminster and Edinburgh
were identified and interviewed. Whilst not all those
approached agreed to participate, respondents came
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from all sectors of the alcohol industry, including the on
and off trade; producers of wines, spirits and beers; retai-
lers of various kinds; and involving both individual cor-
porations and trade associations. Our sample also
included a range of non-industry actors who had know-
ledge of the alcohol policy process and the involvement
of corporate actors, including former Ministers, Mem-
bers of Parliament and of the Scottish Parliament, civil
servants, members of civil society organisations and pro-
fessional groups. Interviews with these respondents were
then triangulated with those with industry respondents
in order to build as accurate a picture as possible of in-
dustry participation in the policy process. These inter-
views were also informed by, and triangulated with, the
public statements of the various industry actors on
MUP, particularly in response to consultative exercises
undertaken by the Westminster and Edinburgh govern-
ments. A total of 35 interviews were conducted between
June and November 2010. Table 1 sets out the number
of respondents from each sector and indicates the num-
ber of potential respondents approached who did not re-
spond to our request for an interview, or did not wish to
participate in the study.
With respondents’ permission, interviews were
recorded and the transcripts of these analysed using
Nvivo software. Whilst a number of themes emerged
from the interviews, the analysis presented here focused
upon intra-industry dynamics and their implications for
the making of alcohol policy. Major themes which
emerged from the project include the various political
strategies of industry actors, the industry ‘framing’ of key
alcohol policy issues and the impact of devolution in
Scotland upon alcohol policy [21]. Analysis for this art-
icle is based upon identification of the key cleavages
within the industry, as revealed by the interview data and
its triangulation with relevant publicly available docu-
ments. Furthermore, our analysis is restricted to the issue
of pricing and promotions policy and related issues and
does not investigate the different cleavages which exist
between industry actors on other issues. In order to
improve the reliability of the analysis, both the researcher
who had conducted the interviews (BH) and the first au-
thor (CH) listened to recordings of them before agreeing
initial key themes, allowing for an iterative process of re-
finement as the final analysis was undertaken.
Findings
The alcohol industry is composed of companies with
often widely differing strategic interests and organisa-
tional cultures. One representative from a national trade
association commented that:
This is a very, very fragmented industry. No one likes
each other very much; the on-trade hates the off-trade,
wine and spirit and beer companies they’re all arguing
about various things.
Similarly, a representative from a national chain of
supermarkets argued that ‘. . .the only thing that every-
body has in common is that . . . they want to be able to
continue to sell alcohol.’
In order to understand the dynamics of the alcohol
policy debate in the UK it is necessary therefore to
examine the positions adopted by different industry
actors on specific issues and the degree to which they
were able to form alliances and act collectively. The coa-
litions of interests which exist between different actors
lead to the emergence of a number of cleavages between
different companies and sectors of the industry. There
are cleavages evident between producers and retailers
and, within the retail sector, between the on-trade and
the off-trade. The divisions within the alcohol industry,
however, exist not only between sectors, but within
them. Further cleavages are evident within the producer
sector between different product categories and within
the retail sector between the different types of off-trade
retailers. We examine each of these cleavages in turn be-
fore discussing the role of trade associations in man-
aging the tensions between their member companies
and their links with associations in different sectors of
the industry. Finally, we examine rationale behind actors’
attempts to co-ordinate their public affairs activities.
Producers and retailers
The increasing focus on the retail arm of the alcohol in-
dustry in debates about alcohol related harm has led to
the emergence of a cleavage between retailers of alcohol
on the one hand and producers on the other. In
addition, certain producers claimed to be dissatisfied
with the way in which their products are sold by certain
supermarkets. There appeared to be a tension between
the desire of producers to market their products as pre-
mium brands and the desire of supermarkets to use dis-
counted alcohol to attract customers into their stores
Table 1 Breakdown of interview respondents by sector
Sector Interviews
Conducted
Did not
Respond
Declined
Interview
Total
Producer
companies
5 2 4 11
On-trade operators 2 2 0 4
Off-trade retailers 2 2 1 5
Industry Trade
Associations
13 0 0 13
Government 7 29 12 48
Public Health 6 0 1 7
Total 35 35 18 88
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and so increase sales. As a representative of a producer
organisation commented:
I think the reason why Molson Coors will advocate
minimum pricing is that they find it very difficult to
build their brands through supermarkets because
supermarkets keep on discounting them, they keep on
selling them cheaply, they’ll sell them in conjunction
with other brands so it will be buy any two out of
Carling, Carlsberg, Fosters, which creates in the
consumer’s mind this idea that all the brands are
interchangeable and it undermines all causes and
attempts to build up a certain profile for their brand,
to build up a certain image for it etc. The
supermarkets will just reduce it all to: It’s just liquid.
It’s just liquid to get down your neck, kind of thing.
This view was echoed by MSP Michael Matheson
who, as a member of the Scottish Parliament’s Health
and Sport Committee, was involved with the develop-
ment of the Scottish Government’s proposed legislation
introducing MUP:
And because they have premium brands, they aren’t
really happy with the way in which the supermarkets
are squeezing them on their margins, because
supermarkets are saying well we want to stock high
and sell cheap, and if you want your products in our
place you’re going to have to play that game I’m
afraid, guys.
The supermarkets’ strategy had a number of conse-
quences for the business models adopted by brewers.
The downward pressure exerted on profit margins meant
profits could only be achieved through a higher volume
of sales. This ran counter to the strategy of some
brewers, such as Molson Coors, whose business model
was based around lower production volumes of higher
margin, premium products. A representative of the com-
pany explained that this was behind their decision to
support discussions about the possibility of banning
below cost selling:
Molson Coors is open around below cost selling and
minimum pricing – none of our competitors are. We
took a conscious decision about eighteen months ago
to increase our prices in the market, and to cut
volume, and that has helped us. . . we think that’s part
of actually changing beer. . . the beer agenda. Since
then some of our competitors have followed us on
that, and others haven’t; so very different strategies
and beliefs.
The tensions between the producers and the off-trade
are not limited to the frustrations felt by certain
producers about the business practices of the supermar-
kets. Representatives of the off-trade were also critical of
how they thought producers had stymied the industry’s
efforts to promote responsible drinking:
I’m cynical, listening to some of the stuff about
producers and I remember the battle that we had
originally with Department of Health, the producers
did with their original health label. Our members
looked at it and thought, “Okay. Looks okay. It’s a
health label. All it’s doing is telling people this has got
2 units, don’t drink more than 4.” The producers were
completely against that because they saw it as the
next step towards the tobacco smoking ban: the big
pictures with labels on it.
The on-trade and the off-trade
In addition to the cleavages which exist between produ-
cers and retailers, there are divisions evident between
different branches of the retail sector. These are princi-
pally issues in which the interests of the off-trade are set
against those of the on-trade. Representatives of the on-
trade felt that they had been unfairly treated by recent
legislation in comparison to supermarkets and that this
was leading to a decline in on-sale revenues. As a re-
spondent from a pub operator commented:
I think that legislation for the on-trade is absolutely
sensible and so there’s no happy hours and all that
sort of stuff. So that’s fine, no irresponsible
promotions. What there is though is a strange
dichotomy, a difference between the on-trade and the
off-trade. The off-trade, you can buy whatever, 18
pints for a tenner. You can drown in that. But there’s
different rules for the on-trade and the off-trade.
Other respondents, such as the Secretary of the All
Party Parliamentary Beer Group, felt that pubs were the
victims of a concerted campaign by supermarkets to
drive people from the on-trade to the off-trade:
It is a cut-throat business and it appears pretty clear
that the major players have been quite deliberately
pursuing a strategy which. . . drove the pub out of
business in order to add further impetus to the shift
from the on to the off-trade. But they’ve done it
before. They did it with greengrocers and they did it
with butchers, they did it with bakers. That’s what
they do – they drive other people out of business.
Why shouldn’t they do it with pubs?
Some respondents from the off-trade resented this
view, with one representative of a retailers’ trade associ-
ation referring to a ‘real victim complex that’s been
developed in the pub trade over the last four or five
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years, partly down to the sheer weight of closures of
pubs.’ Supermarkets operators, however, sensed a shift
in the climate of the debate around alcohol policy, with
some expressing the view that their businesses had be-
come an ‘easy target’ for both legislators and the media.
Intra-sectoral cleavages
It is perhaps not surprising that there are differences of
opinion or conflicting interests between different sectors
of the industry. However, cleavages between actors are
evident within sectors of the industry as well as between
them. Within the producer sector the differing interests
of beer, wine, spirit and cider producers play off against
one another. Within the retail sector, the interests of the
off-trade are distinct from those of the on trade. Within
these subsectors too there are differences between large-
scale multiple retailers, such as supermarkets and pub
companies (pubcos) and smaller, often independent,
retailers and publicans.
Producers
Within the producer sector there are a number of clea-
vages evident between different product sub-sectors.
Principally, these disputes centre on the differential levels
of tax and duty levied on different types of products such
as beer, cider and spirits. The first of these cleavages is
between beer and spirits producers. Whilst spirits produ-
cers have argued for equivalency in the rates of duty lev-
ied on alcoholic drinks – which would create a direct
relationship between the volume of alcohol within a
product and the level of duty levied upon it – beer pro-
ducers reject this idea since it would lead to a sharp in-
crease in the price of beer relative to spirits. They argue
instead that the lower levels of duty levied on beer should
be maintained on the grounds that it is a low alcohol
product and thus should be promoted as a healthier
choice for consumers than stronger alternatives.
A further cleavage emerged between the beer produ-
cers and cider producers, again over the issue of taxation.
Whilst beer producers argued that beer and cider are
equivalent products which should therefore be treated
similarly by the taxation system, cider producers were
keen to highlight the particular costs involved in cider
production – and the economics of apple production –
which necessitated government support for the industry
through the tax system.
The main policy difference between cider and spirits
producers focussed not on the issue of taxation but on
the debates surrounding underage drinking, binge drink-
ing and related public order issues. Representatives of
the cider industry were keen to argue that it was not their
product which was responsible for these issues and
sought to lay the blame instead on cheap spirits and
spirit based ‘alcopops.’ Spirits producers, meanwhile,
claimed the exact opposite: that cheap ciders and strong
lagers, rather than spirits, were the issue.
In addition, divisions emerged between producers
within the same product category. This may occur be-
cause the brand portfolios of certain companies traverse
different drinks categories, requiring them to adopt
nuanced and carefully formulated positions on issues
affecting one sector of the market in such a way that it
would not affect its interests in another. Similarly, these
positions may reflect very different marketing strategies
and perhaps even corporate cultures between different
brewers. Differences of opinion between producers were
most evident in the beer sector with some producers,
such as Tennent’s and Molson Coors, coming out in
favour of MUP in Scotland and others strongly opposing
the measure. As the representative of Molson Coors
commented:
in this industry you have very conflicting opinions,
you have very different market practices. So you’ll
have some companies who are. . . selling it at bonkers
prices [. . .] So you have very conflicting, almost
industry destroying strategies from some competitors
who think this is an OK way to behave, and then you
have other people that try and take a more balanced,
nuanced view. You have people that are anti-
regulation; so you have some kind of real tensions.
Producers have thus found it difficult to adopt a clear
and coherent position on pricing policy or to present a
consistent message to government on this issue.
The off-trade
Within the off-trade sector, there are a number of clea-
vages evident which reflect the differing interests of par-
ticular companies. The off-trade includes an incredibly
diverse array of retailers in terms of scale, ranging from
the largest supermarket chains down to independent
convenience stores. As a representative of the Associ-
ation of Convenience Stores (ACS) highlighted, the issue
of below cost selling is an area in which the interests of
small and independent retailers diverge from those of
larger chains of supermarkets which are able to use dis-
counted alcohol to attract customers into their stores:
The issue that we’re more interested in, even more
than we are in alcohol, is the issue of the power of
supermarkets; and. . . we believe that supermarkets . . .
should be prohibited from selling low-cost across the
whole product range of what they do, because we
think that is. . . that has predatory impacts on
competition in the broader marketplace.
Consequently, the ACS were open to the possibility of
a ban on discounted sales of alcohol and would seek to
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try to influence the details of any prospective pricing
intervention in such a way as to benefit the interests of
their membership.
In addition to the cleavages which exist between
supermarkets and smaller retailers, there are differences
in business strategy and policy position which exist be-
tween the largest supermarkets operators. For example,
whilst Tesco and Morrisons tentatively welcomed the
possibility of a ban on below cost selling, others were
more reticent about the desirability or the effectiveness
of this type of policy. A further point of contention
centred on how the cost of alcoholic beverages would be
calculated in any policy which sought to prohibit below
cost selling. The representative of one national super-
market chain was concerned about the possibility of this
being based on invoice price: the price at which each
supermarket purchases alcohol from producers. This,
they feared, would hand a competitive advantage to
Tesco, the largest UK retailer, which due to its size may
be able to negotiate lower purchase prices with manu-
facturers than other supermarkets.
Some representatives from other supermarkets felt
that the decision by Tesco to support a ban on below
cost selling was motivated by the competitive advantage
it would hand them in relation to other supermarkets.
As the current market leader, a ban on discounting
could consolidate Tesco’s position within the alcohol
market. Furthermore, it would prevent its competitors
using alcohol pricing as a means of gaining wider market
share from Tesco.
Trade associations
The crucial role played by trade associations in the pub-
lic affairs work of both alcohol producers and retailers is
reflected in the number of associations active within the
alcohol industry. In the producer sector in particular,
companies are often members of multiple associations
which focus on a particular aspect of their business or
which represent their interests in a specific forum or at
a particular level of government. Within the field of al-
cohol policy, the main trade associations are the British
Beer and Pub Association (BBPA) and the Wine and
Spirits Trade Association (WSTA). The interests of other
groups are represented through the National Association
of Cider Makers (NACM), the Gin and Vodka Associ-
ation (GVA), the Association of Licensed Multiple Retai-
lers (ALMR), which represents the interests of larger
pub operators, and NOCTIS, representing nightclubs
and the late night sector. In terms of the off-trade, the
British Retail Consortium (BRC) represents the interests
of supermarkets and other retailers whilst the Associ-
ation of Convenience Stores (ACS) represents smaller
scale retailers.
The BBPA represents not only the interests of brewers
and marketers of beer, but those of publicans and the
pub industry. Similarly, the remit of the WSTA is to rep-
resent the interests of wine and spirits producers and
importers as well as off-trade retailers. This division of
labour reflects a coalition of interests between particular
producers and routes to market. The WSTA’s concern
with the off-trade is a consequence of the fact that the
majority of wine and spirits in the UK are sold through
the off-trade. Similarly, whilst increasing volumes of beer
are now sold through supermarkets and other off-trade
retailers, the alliance between brewers and on-trade
retailers evident in the BBPA was forged from the histor-
ical connections between the brewers and the pubs
through which their beer is sold.
Trade associations representing a single product cat-
egory, such as the NACM, or a single section of the indus-
try such as the ALMR, felt they were able to adopt a
united position on most issues of importance to their
membership. However, given that the larger trade associa-
tions such as the BBPA, the WSTA and the BRC are broad
churches – containing members from different sectors of
the industry and with varying interests – it is often diffi-
cult for them to speak with a single, uniform voice on a
given issue. The potentially conflicting interests of differ-
ent groups must be taken into account in order to arrive
at positions on which most members can agree.
Consequently, the arguments made by trade associa-
tions often represent the lowest common denominator
on which all members can agree and may affect the abil-
ity of the association to articulate the views of its mem-
bers to government. The BBPA, for example, faced
problems in arriving at a common position on pricing
policy given the differing perspectives of pub owners
and producers and the differences of opinion which
existed between producer members on the issue. Given
the differing views on these issues, a number of BBPA
members felt that the association was perhaps not as ef-
fective a channel for engaging government as it could
be. As the representative of a brewing organisation com-
mented, the diverse membership of the BBPA makes it
difficult for the organisation to articulate the views of its
members clearly and effectively:
We are letting BBPA to be the ones that will go to the
government and express our views. What makes it a
little bit complicated, the BBPA is the beer and pub
association. Actually, the big brewers are all members
but then you have all the pub companies and the local
brewers, most of them. We don’t always have the
same view.
The problems faced by trade associations in agreeing
on a common position on the most commercially
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sensitive issues was highlighted by the decision of Tesco,
the UK’s largest retail operator, to support some form of
government intervention on alcohol pricing. This ran
counter to the agreed policy position of trade associa-
tions such as the BRC and the WSTA of which it is a
member. Whilst elements of dissent are inevitable within
any trade association, a departure from the agreed line
by the biggest and potentially most influential member
poses clear problems. As a representative from one such
association commented:
Without a doubt it’s made our job harder, yeah. But
they were kind enough to tell us they were going to
do it, and talked to us about it, and allowed us the
opportunity to discuss and understand why they
wanted to do it, and I think we’re fairly clear on
what’s behind the decision etcetera. It does make life
much more difficult, but a conversation was had
which went along the lines of ‘the rest of the
membership doesn’t want to change their position on
minimum pricing’, that’s fine, we accept that. They
didn’t. . . and at no point have they asked us to change
our position.
Whilst certain organisations such as Tesco could
break ranks with the agreed positions of the trade
associations which represent them, this option was not
available to all companies whose size, political influ-
ence and resources meant they had little choice other
than to rely on trade associations to represent their
views. Great importance was placed by these compan-
ies on ensuring that the line agreed by the association
took into account their particular perspective on a
given issue. As the representative of one retail com-
pany commented:
Yeah, I mean trade associations you can throw money
at them, but unless you participate and you develop
the relationships within the trade association your
voice isn’t going to be heard. [. . .] I mean I spent, you
know, like yesterday, I spent an hour on the phone
talking to the food policy lead at the BRC, talking
about his first draft of the licensing submission. Now
if I hadn’t done that; if I hadn’t talked to him for an
hour, and I hadn’t done it at that stage, he would have
written something quite different.
Despite the obvious challenges faced by trade associa-
tions and the frequent difficulty they experienced in ar-
riving at common positions, almost all respondents felt
that they remained important actors in the policy
process. By representing the industry – or a particular
sector of it – collectively, trade associations were often
able to influence policy debates more effectively than
companies acting unilaterally. This view was shared even
by those respondents who had been critical of certain
aspects of their trade association’s work:
We go through the collective organisations because
we also believe [. . .] we would like to have one view
as an industry because this is the better way to do
it and this is also why associations are there, to
represent us. And even if we don’t agree with
everything that others say, it’s better to have a
common view than to come up as a split kind of
tribe.
Whilst the largest companies recognised the value
of trade associations, their ability to act unilaterally
meant they could be highly pragmatic in their use of
these associations. Where there was seen to be an ad-
vantage in acting collectively, they would look to ad-
vance their interests through this channel. However,
where there appeared to be an advantage to the com-
pany in acting independently, they were prepared to
do so. As the representative of a national trade asso-
ciation explained:
And sometimes it’s also quite powerful for companies
to take a different position to the rest of the sector
because they can say to government and people,
‘Look, we’re the responsible guys here. It’s those
others you’ve got a problem with’ in lots of areas that
they’d be dealing with them. So sometimes our
members like to have a different position to
everybody else, to say that, ‘We’re the ones who are
differentiating and we’re different. So we’re up here
and they're down there somewhere’.
Breaking ranks with their competitors allows the com-
pany in question to stay ahead of debates on issues such
as minimum pricing and to present themselves as indus-
try leaders. Rather than being part of the problem of al-
cohol related harm, they can present themselves as an
integral part of the solution, at the forefront of new mea-
sures and initiatives to tackle the issue.
Policy makers may also find it useful to exploit the
cleavages between certain actors in order to drive for-
ward their policy agenda. As a former Minister of Public
Health put it:
So I mean the trade associations were helpful, but do
you know sometimes just trying to find, I think in this
area, trying to find a leader in that sector who’s
prepared to break from the pack and do something
different, or be prepared to think about things
differently, is actually a really. . . I think that’s a really
good win if you can do that.
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This point was confirmed by the representative of an
industry trade association:
But often officials will pick and choose and they’ll play
people off against one another so I’ll sit in a meeting,
they’ll say, ‘That’s not what one of your members told
me last week.’And so they’ll pick and choose stuff to
try and cajole people on. They’ll often use one
company against another company as well, to say,
‘Well, if they can do it, why can’t you do it?’ Those
sorts of things.
Thus, whilst actors are keen to highlight the advan-
tages of collective action, there are also potential benefits
to be gained from presenting an individual viewpoint on
certain issues. This is especially the case where an indus-
try actor is able to fall in line behind a particular govern-
ment initiative. Recognising the direction of travel of the
policy debate and staying ahead of the trend enables
companies to position themselves as responsible actors
and as partners in the policy process.
In addition to trade associations it is necessary to
highlight the role played by ‘social aspects’ organiza-
tions such as the Portman Group (PG). The PG was
formed by, and continues to be governed and funded
by, the UK’s leading alcohol producers. Initially
founded to speak on behalf of its membership on the
social aspects of alcohol, its role in promoting respon-
sible drinking has since been handed over to Drinka-
ware. The PG’s main remit is now the implementation
of its voluntary code of practice on the promotion and
packaging of alcoholic beverages. However, it continues
to represent the perspectives of producers on alcohol
related issues both to politicians and through the
media.
Whilst representatives from the PG and its member
companies are keen to highlight that it is not a trade
association and argue that it does not seek to further
industry objectives, commentators from outside the in-
dustry see it as a mouthpiece for the industry [22]. A
representative from Alcohol Focus Scotland, for ex-
ample, recalled that it was often the PG – along with
trade associations such as the WSTA – who would
represent the industry perspective in the public debates
on MUP in which she participated. Similarly, the PG
felt it appropriate to make a submission to the Scot-
tish Government’s consultation on the Alcohol Etc
(Scotland) Bill. The appearance of autonomy from the
industry is important to the function of the PG. It
gives the organization a credibility and status not
afforded to trade associations whose remit is more
overtly to represent the interests of its members. Con-
sequently, the PG has been afforded an important role
not just in the regulation of alcohol marketing, but
was given great prominence within previous govern-
ments’ alcohol strategies [23].
Connections and co-operation within the alcohol industry
The existence of trade associations and the reliance on
them by many organisations is indicative of the perceived
importance of coordination by industry actors, despite
their sometimes conflicting interests. There was a wide-
spread belief amongst respondents that the ability of the
industry (or particular sectors of it) to speak to govern-
ment with a single voice was extremely beneficial in influ-
encing the direction of policy in areas in which corporate
actors have shared interests. Consequently, there is a cer-
tain paradox at the heart of the relationship between alco-
hol industry actors. On the one hand they are rival
companies competing for a share of their respective mar-
kets, whilst on the other they often share strategic inter-
ests which they are more effectively able to defend when
acting collectively. Gerard Hastings from the Stirling
Management School argues that the situation faced by the
alcohol industry is similar to that of the tobacco industry:
The comparison with tobacco is good; once you get to
producer level. . . the different tobacco companies
hate each other, but, you know, on occasion, they will
come together and try and work together.
It was evident from the interviews conducted that there
are frequent contacts between industry actors through a
variety of forums. Most obviously, representatives of dif-
ferent organisations meet within the context of trade asso-
ciations. Given that many organisations are members of
multiple trade associations, the contacts between their
representatives are frequent. This can lead to the forma-
tion of strong and enduring personal relationships be-
tween the individual representatives of different
organisations within these forums. As the representative
of a national chain of supermarkets commented:
I mean I’ve been a lobbyist for a good number of
years, the lobbying community in Westminster is
relatively small – I mean everybody knows everybody
else; everybody has worked with everybody else – and
then you go into the food retail lobbying group, you
know, we all know each other, we see each other at
least once or twice a week, we go to the same
meetings, so everybody knows each other. I mean
I’ve. . . the Head of Corporate Affairs from [another
supermarket chain] used to be my boss in another
job, so everybody knows each other terribly well.
Given their shared objectives, this respondent contin-
ued, the public affairs departments of many corporations
often have more of an affinity with their equivalents in
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other companies than with different departments within
their own organisations:
I mean, you know, in some ways I have more in
common with the Head of Public Affairs at [another
supermarket chain] than I do with the buyers in [my
company], because we kind of think in the same way,
and we share the same frustrations about our
businesses and the way in which they react; so often,
you know, I’ll go in and complain about the way in
which the issue’s being handled, and they’ll have the
same kind of frustrations; [. . .] I might say ‘oh I’m
finding it really difficult to get the business to agree
which of the definitions of below-cost is best for the
business, because they don’t actually understand what
the differences are.’And then, you know, you’ll find that
exactly the same thing’s happening in another business.
There was evidence also that individual corporations
are prepared to co-ordinate their approach to govern-
ment in certain circumstances. One such example is the
coordinated approach between two companies with re-
gard to one of the All Party Parliamentary Groups. Given
the presence both companies have in the constituency of
the Group Chairman, they were keen to be involved in it.
Asked if he had been involved personally with the group,
a representative of one of the companies commented:
The short answer is I have not; that has been most of
the trade associations, however because there’s now a
constituency interest with [the Group Chairman], I
want to be involved because I want to be able to be of
service to him in terms of that; and [the other
company] and I have talked about this, and we’re, you
know, we’re both aligned in terms of that’s how we
want to handle it with him just to make sure that
we’re covered . . . there and to work with the trade
associations in terms of communicating and whatnot.
Asked to clarify whether it was normal for companies
to coordinate their approaches in this way, the respond-
ent explained that there are extensive personal connec-
tions between individuals within different organisations:
I mean normally ‘no’ is the short answer, but . . . in
terms of working with [the Group Chairman], that’s
where we have that conversation. But in all the trade
bodies I’m sitting next to somebody. . . or the trade
bodies or the Portman Group or something like that,
constantly sitting next to somebody not only from
[the other company], but also [people from other
companies]; same thing in the trade associations – we
all know each other, because in addition to that we
have issues between the various companies. . .
In addition to the contacts between corporations there
are also extensive links between different trade associa-
tions. The representatives of one producer organisation
commented, for example, that they are in contact with
other trade associations ‘on a daily basis’. Similarly,
representatives of the ALMR are also in contact with the
BBPA and the British Institute of Inn Keeping, which
also represent the on-trade. There are close relationships
between the BRC and the WSTA, the main trade asso-
ciations representing the off-trade sector. In addition to
those companies which are members of both associa-
tions, the WSTA is itself a member of the BRC. The
chief executive officers of four of the main alcohol trade
associations meet together quarterly in a group called
Trade Association Directors (TAD). The lines of com-
munication between associations thus include both for-
malised channels of communication between the senior
executives of the major trade associations and more in-
formal, ad hoc discussions.
Alongside both the regular and ad hoc dialogue be-
tween associations, there is evidence of more strategic
coordination between trade associations in different
areas. This manifests itself in a division of labour be-
tween trade associations, whereby those with a particular
interest in certain issues, or a specific expertise or geo-
graphical focus, will take the lead on a given issue. The
clearest example of industry coordination of this type oc-
curred in Scotland where the Scotch Whisky Association
(SWA) took the lead on the issue of MUP, reflecting their
specific knowledge of Scottish politics, the economic im-
portance of the whisky industry in Scotland and the em-
blematic nature of whisky for Scottish identity [21].
Discussion and conclusions
The alcohol industry consists of some of the largest cor-
porations in the UK, as well as a number of smaller com-
panies. Given the structure of the industry and the
varying effects minimum pricing would have on different
sectors, it is unsurprising that cleavages should appear.
This article examines divisions between various industry
actors and assesses the impact on their ability to organise
collectively to influence policy. Our analysis indicates
that industry actors were highly divided on the issue of
MUP and related questions. Nevertheless, a number of
coalitions emerged between different sectors which
reflected shared interests or longstanding historical ties.
Whilst there were often sharp disagreements between
actors on substantive issues, there was a general agree-
ment that collaboration between actors offered distinct
advantages to all. Presenting a clear, unified message was
ultimately seen as the most effective way to engage in
policy debates. The dilemma faced by industry actors
then was how to manage the conflict between such
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coordination and the need to advance their specific cor-
porate or sectoral interests.
Many of the cleavages between actors are rooted in
clear material interests which manifest themselves in the
positions adopted on MUP, bans on below costs selling,
or the levels of taxation levied on particular product cat-
egories. Whilst there was much disagreement between
actors on substantive issues, there was widespread agree-
ment about the desirability of the industry speaking with
a single voice in its dealings with government. Trade
associations are seen as an important channel for en-
gaging with government because they are able to speak
on behalf of the entire industry or, at least, a particular
sector. However, it may be difficult for associations to
arrive at a common position on the most controversial
issues and so their effectiveness may be diluted by their
need to accommodate all view points. In addition, the
largest and politically most influential corporations can
be highly pragmatic in their use of associations, seeking
backing for their position amongst the membership of
the association where possible, and breaking ranks when
there is an advantage in so doing. Alongside trade asso-
ciations, the interests of many of the largest producer
companies are represented by the Portman Group. Des-
pite its claims to autonomy, the group maintains close
links with the member companies which fund it and is
afforded a prominent place by government in policy
debates [22].
Our study was limited in that some of those
approached for interview declined or did not respond
(see Table 1). Furthermore, it depended primarily on
what interview respondents were willing to share with
us and on information that was present in publically
available documents. The increasing public perception
of a need to find solutions to alcohol related problems
has placed pressure on the industry, which may explain
why some respondents appeared to lay the blame for
such problems with other sections of the industry.
Claims of industry fragmentation in interview responses
may be in the interests of certain actors, who can thus
present themselves as doing all they can in difficult cir-
cumstances. However, it may also be contrary to the
interests of the industry as a whole, since it implies that
only government regulation can be successful in impos-
ing solutions on such a fragmented industry. This real-
isation is partially reflected in the continued attempts to
agree common industry positions. We were able to miti-
gate these inherent problems of interpretation by tri-
angulating data from respondents from all sectors of the
industry and with those of other stakeholders with in-
timate knowledge of the alcohol policy process.
Alcohol industry corporations and trade associations
collaborate with one another effectively where there are
shared interests, allowing the best placed bodies to lead
on a given issue. Thus, whilst industry actors may be
deeply divided on certain issues they are able to coordin-
ate their positions on occasions where there are clear
advantages in so doing. Alongside more formal arrange-
ments, this appears to be facilitated by the personal rela-
tionships and shared perspectives of industry personnel,
particularly from companies’ public affairs departments.
The internal divisions of the industry appear to offer
some hope for public health actors attempting to influ-
ence alcohol policy. As recent moves to implement
MUP in Scotland and England demonstrate, access to
policy makers does not necessarily translate into influ-
ence. The Scottish debates in particular highlight what
can be achieved by a well organised and unified public
health lobby. The ability of public health actors to ar-
ticulate a clear and consistent policy position played a
key role in bringing MUP onto the agenda, even in the
face of strong industry opposition [21]. Nevertheless, in-
dustry actors remain extremely influential. They are
highly pragmatic and well resourced actors. Larger
actors can engage government effectively when acting
alone as well as in unison. The long term relationships
they cultivate with decision makers ensure they are seen
as key stakeholders and retain a seat at the policy-
making table, despite the divisions which may exist.
Whilst industry actors have the resources and channels
of influence to act effectively even where divisions exist,
this is not the case for public health actors. The debates
on MUP demonstrate the vital importance of coherence
and coordination for public health advocates when en-
gaging in policy debates [21]. Policymakers may also
benefit from an awareness of the multiplicity of interests
within the industry and the ways that these may shape
collective positions, such as those articulated by trade
associations, when formulating and consulting on policy.
Although the diverse range of actors comprising the
industry is well established [15,16], this is the first study
to examine how internal industry dynamics affect their
ability to organise politically. As such, it provides a foun-
dation for further research into the processes by which
industry actors attempt to influence alcohol policy.
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